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Abstract
We present an approach for designing correct-by-construction neural networks
(and other machine learning models) that are guaranteed to be consistent with
a collection of input-output specifications before, during, and after algorithm
training. Our method involves designing a constrained predictor for each set of
compatible constraints, and combining them safely via a convex combination of
their predictions. We demonstrate our approach on synthetic datasets and an aircraft
collision avoidance problem.
1 Introduction
The increasing use of machine learning models, such as neural networks, in safety-critical applications
(e.g., autonomous vehicles, aircraft collision avoidance) motivates an urgent need to develop safety
and robustness guarantees. Such models may be required to satisfy certain input-output specifications
to ensure the algorithms adhere to the laws of physics, can be executed safely, and can be encoded
with any a-priori domain knowledge. In addition, these models should exhibit adversarial robustness,
i.e., ensure outputs do not change drastically within small regions of an input – a property that neural
networks often violate (Szegedy et al. [2013]).
Recent work has demonstrated an ability to formally verify input-output specifications as well as
adversarial robustness properties of neural networks. For example, the Satisfiability Modulo Theory
(SMT) solver Reluplex (Katz et al. [2017a]) was used to verify properties of networks under devel-
opment for use in the Next-Generation Aircraft Collision Avoidance System for Unmanned aircraft
(ACAS Xu), and later used to verify adversarial robustness properties in Katz et al. [2017b]. While
Reluplex and other similar approaches are successful at identifying whether a network satisfies a given
specification, these works provide no way to guarantee that the network meets those specifications.
Thus, additional methods are still needed to modify networks if and when they are found to lack a
desired property.
Techniques for designing networks with certified adversarial robustness are beginning to emerge
(Gowal et al. [2018], Cohen et al. [2019]), but enforcing more general safety properties in neural net-
works remains largely unexplored. In Lin et al. [2019], the authors propose a technique for achieving
provably correct neural networks through abstraction-refinement optimization and demonstrate their
approach on the ACAS-Xu dataset. Their network, however, is not guaranteed to meet the desired
specifications until after it has undergone training. We seek to design networks for which input-output
constraints are enforced even before the network has been trained to enable use in online learning
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scenarios, where a system may be required to guarantee a set of safety constraints are never violated
during the entirety of its operation.
This paper proposes an approach for designing a safe predictor (a neural network or any other
machine learning model) that obeys a set of constraints on the input-output relationships, assuming
the constrained output regions can be formulated to be convex. Even before training begins, and at
each subsequent iteration of training, our correct-by-construction safe predictor is guaranteed to meet
the desired constraints. We describe our approach in detail in Section 2, and demonstrate its use for
the aircraft collision avoidance problem from Julian et al. [2019] in Section 3. Results on synthetic
datasets are shown in Appendix B.
2 Method
Given two normed vector spaces, an input space X and output space Y , and a collection of c different
pairs of input-output constraints, (Ai, Bi), where Ai ⊂ X and Bi is a convex subset of Y for each
constraint i, the goal is to design a safe predictor, F : X → Y , that guarantees x ∈ Ai ⇒ F (x) ∈ Bi.
Let ~b be a bit-string of length c. We define O~b to be the set of points x such that, for all i, bi = 1
implies x ∈ Ai and bi = 0 implies x /∈ Ai. O~b thus represents the overlap regions for each
combination of the input constraints. For example, O101 is the set of points in A1 and A3 but not in
A2, and O0···0 is the set where no input constraints apply. We also defineO to be the set of bit-strings,
~b, such that O~b is non-empty, and we define k := ‖O‖. {O~b : ~b ∈ O} partitions X according to
which combination of input constraints apply.
Given:
• c different input constraint proximity functions, ςi : X → [0, 1], where ςi is continuous and
∀x ∈ Ai, ςi(x) = 0
• k different constrained predictors, G~b : X →
⋂
{i:bi=1}
Bi , one for each~b ∈ O, such that the
domain of each G~b is non-empty
1
we define:
• k different weighting functions, w~b(x) :=
∏
{i:bi=0}
[ςi(x)]
∏
{i:bi=1}
[1− ςi(x)]
• a safe predictor, F (x) :=
∑
~b∈O
w~b(x)·G~b(x)∑
~b∈O
w~b(x)
Theorem 2.1. For all i, if x ∈ Ai, F (x) ∈ Bi.
A formal proof of Theorem 2.1 is presented in Appendix A, and can be summarized as: if an input is
inA1, then by construction of the proximity and weighting functions, all of the constrained predictors,
G~b, that do not map to B1 will be given zero weight. Only the constrained predictors that map to B1
will be given non-zero weight, and due to the convexity ofB1, the weighted average of the predictions
will remain in B1.
If all G~b are continuous and if there are no two input sets, Ai and Aj , for which (Ai ∩ Aj) ⊂
(∂Ai ∪ ∂Aj) (i.e., no input constraint regions intersect only on their boundary), then F is continuous.
In the worst case, as the number of constraints grows linearly, the number of constrained predictors
required to describe our safe predictor will grow exponentially.2 For real applications, however, we
expect many of the constraint overlap sets, O~b, to be empty. Thus, any predictors that correspond to
an empty set can be ignored, resulting in a much lower number of constrained predictors needed in
practice.
See Figure 1 for an illustrative example of how to construct F (x) for a notional problem with two
overlapping input-output constraints.
1For example, G101 maps inputs from X to the output region (B1 ∩B3). Note that G0···0 is a degenerate
“constrained” predictor, since none of the constraints apply to it and it can map into all of Y .
2For c constraints, the maximum number of possible non-empty overlap regions is k = 2c.
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Figure 1: Notional depiction of a safe predictor with two input-output constraints.
2.1 Proximity Functions
The proximity functions, ςi, describe how close an input, x, is to a given input constraint region,
Ai, and these functions are used to compute the weights of the constrained predictors. A desirable
property for ςi is for ςi(x)→ 1 as d(x,Ai)→∞, for some distance function,3 so that when an input
is far from a constraint region, the constraint has little effect on the prediction for that input. A natural
choice for a function that provides this property is:
ςi(x; Σi) = 1− exp
[
−
(
d(x,Ai)
σ1
)σ2]
, (1)
where Σi is the pair of parameters σ1 ∈ (0,∞) and σ2 ∈ (1,∞), which could be specified using
engineering judgment, or learned via optimization over training data. In our experiments in this paper,
we use proximity functions of this form and learn independent parameters for each input-constrained
region. We plan to explore other choices for proximity functions in future work.
2.2 Learning
If we have families of differentiable functions G~b(x; θ~b), continuously parameterized by θ~b, and
families of ςi(x; Σi), differentiable and continuously parameterized by Σi, then F (x; ~θ, ~Σ), where
~θ={θ~b : ~b ∈ O} and ~Σ={Σi : i = 1, . . . , c}, is also continuously parameterized and differentiable.
We can now perform ordinary optimization techniques (e.g., gradient descent) to find the parameters
of F that minimize a loss function on some dataset, while still preserving the desired safety properties.
Note that the safety guarantee holds no matter which parameters are chosen. In practice, to create
each G~b(x; θ~b), we imagine choosing:
• a latent space Rm,
• a map h~b : Rm →
⋂
{i:bi=1}
Bi ,
• a standard neural network architecture g~b : X → Rm,
and then defining G~b(x; θ~b) := h~b(g~b(x; θ~b)).
Note that this framework does not necessarily require an entirely separate network for each ~b. In
many applications, it may be useful for the constrained predictors to share earlier layers, thus learning
a shared representation of the input space. Additionally, our definition of the safe predictor is general
and not limited to neural networks.
In Appendix B, we show an example of applying our approach to synthetic datasets in 2-D and 3-D
using simple neural networks. These examples illustrate that our safe predictor can enforce arbitrary
input-output specifications with convex output constraints on neural networks and that the function
we are learning is smooth.
3For a set S ⊂ X , d(x, S) := inf
x′∈S
d(x, x′).
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3 Application to Aircraft Collision Avoidance
Aircraft collision avoidance is an application that requires strong safety guarantees. The Next-
Generation Collision Avoidance System (ACAS X), which issues advisories to avoid near mid-air
collisions and will have both manned (ACAS Xa) and unmanned (ACAS Xu) variants, was originally
designed to select optimal advisories while minimizing disruptive alerts by solving a partially-
observable Markov decision process (Kochenderfer [2015]). The solution took the form of an
extremely large look-up table mapping each possible input combination to scores for each possible
advisory, and the advisory with the highest score is issued. Julian et al. [2016] proposed compressing
the policy tables using a deep neural network (DNN), which then introduced the need to verify that
the DNNs met certain safety specifications.
In Jeannin et al. [2017], the authors defined a desirable “safeability” property for ACAS X, which
specified that for any given input state in the “safeable region,” an advisory would never be issued
that would put the aircraft in a future state for which a safe advisory (i.e., an action that will prevent a
collision) no longer existed. This notion is similar to the concept of control invariance (Blanchini
[1999]). Julian et al. [2019] created a simplified model of the ACAS Xa system (called VerticalCAS),
generated DNNs to approximate the learned policy, and used Reluplex (Katz et al. [2017a]) to verify
whether the DNNs satisfied the safeability property. The authors found thousands of counterexamples
for which their DNNs violated this property, and suggested that the construction of a network that
ensures such a property remained an open problem.
Our proposed safe predictor will ensure that any collision avoidance system will meet the safeability
property by construction. We describe in detail in Appendix C how we apply our approach to a
subset of the VerticalCAS datasets using a conservative, convex approximation of the safeability
constraints. These constraints are defined such that if a given aircraft state is in the “unsafeable
region,” Aunsafeable,i, for the ith advisory, the score for that advisory must not be the highest, i.e.,
x ∈ Aunsafeable,i ⇒ F i(x) < maxj F j(x), where F j(x) is the output score for the jth advisory.
Results of our experiments are in Table 1 where we compare a standard, unconstrained network to
our safe predictor, and report the percentage accuracy (ACC) and violations (i.e., percentage of inputs
for which the network outputs an “unsafeable” advisory) for each network. We train and test using
PyTorch (Paszke et al. [2017]) with two separate datasets: one based on the previous advisory being
Clear of Conflict (COC) and the other for the previous advisory Climb at 1500 ft/min (CL1500).4
As expected, our safe predictor does not violate the desired safeability property. Additionally, the
accuracy of our predictor is not impacted with respect to the unconstrained network, an indication
that we are not losing accuracy in order to achieve safety guarantees for this example.
NETWORK ACC (COC) VIOLATIONS (COC) ACC (CL1500) VIOLATIONS (CL1500)
STANDARD 96.87 0.22 93.89 0.20
SAFE 96.69 0.00 94.78 0.00
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF PERCENT ACCURACY AND VIOLATIONS FOR VERTICALCAS
4 Discussions and Future Work
We present an approach for designing a safe predictor that obeys a set of input-output specifications
for use in safety-critical machine learning systems, and demonstrate it on a problem in aircraft
collision avoidance. The novelty of this approach is in its simplicity and guaranteed enforcement (at
all stages of algorithm training) of the specifications via combinations of convex output constraints.
Future work includes adapting and leveraging techniques from optimization (Amos and Kolter [2017])
and control barrier functions (Cheng et al. [2019], Glotfelter et al. [2019]), and incorporating notions
of adversarial robustness into the design of our safe predictor, such as extending the work of Hein and
Andriushchenko [2017], Weng et al. [2018], and Virmaux and Scaman [2018] to bound the Lipschitz
constant of our networks.
4A description of all of the advisories is given in Table 2 in Appendix C.
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A Proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof. Fix i, and suppose that x ∈ Ai. Thus ςi(x) = 0, so for all~b ∈ O where bi = 0, w~b(x) = 0.
Thus F (x) :=
∑
{~b:bi=1}
w~b(x)·G~b(x)∑
{~b:bi=1}
w~b(x)
. If bi = 1, G~b(x) ∈ Bi, thus F (x) is also in Bi by the convexity
of Bi.
B Example on Synthetic Datasets
Figure 2 depicts an example of applying our safe predictor to a notional regression problem given
inputs and outputs in 1-D with one input-output constraint. The unconstrained network has a single
hidden layer of dimension 10 with rectified linear unit (ReLU) activations, followed by a fully
connected layer. For the safe predictor, the constrained predictors, G0 and G1, share the hidden layer
but have their own fully connected layer. Training uses a sampled subset of points from the input
space, and the learned predictors are shown for the continuous input space.
Figure 3 depicts an example of applying our safe predictor to a notional regression problem given
a 2-D input and 1-D output with two overlapping constraints. The unconstrained network has two
hidden layers, each of dimension 20 and with ReLU activations, followed by a fully connected layer.
The constrained predictors, G00, G10, G01, and G11, share the hidden layers, and have their own
additional hidden layer (of size 20, with ReLU) followed by a fully connected layer. Again, training
uses a sampled subset of of points from the input space, and the learned predictors are shown for the
continuous input space.
C Details of VerticalCAS Experiment
We start with the policies generated by the VerticalCAS system described in Julian et al. [2019] and
generated using their open source code.5 The policy tables report the scores for each of nine possible
advisories (described in Table 2) given the current altitude, h, the time to loss of horizontal separation,
τ , the previously issued advisory, aprev, and the own aircraft and intruder aircraft vertical climb rates,
vO and vI , respectively. Refer to Figure 4 for a depiction of three of these variables.
The policies are optimized using a partially observable Markov decision process to select advisories
to prevent near mid air collisions (NMACs), which is defined as the intruder aircraft being within 100
vertical feet of the own aircraft at time τ = 0. When in operation, the advisory with the highest score
for the current input state is reported. Julian et al. [2019] chose to split the policy table based on
aprev, and train a separate neural network for each previous advisory. Similarly, we test our approach
using separate policy tables for two previous advisories: Clear of Conflict (COC) and Climb at 1500
ft/min (CL1500).
ADVISORY DESCRIPTION
COC Clear of Conflict
DNC Do Not Climb
DND Do Not Descent
DES1500 Descent at least 1500 ft/min
CL1500 Climb at least 1500 ft/min
SDES1500 Strengthen Descent to at least 1500 ft/min
SCL1500 Strengthen Climb to at least 1500 ft/min
SDES2500 Strengthen Descent to at least 2500 ft/min
SCL2500 Strengthen Climb to at least 2500 ft/min
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTION OF ADVISORIES FOR VERTICALCAS FROM JULIAN ET AL. [2019]
5https://github.com/sisl/VerticalCAS
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C.1 Safeability Constraints
The “safeability” property, originally defined in Jeannin et al. [2017] and used to verify the safety of
the VerticalCAS neural networks in Julian et al. [2019], can be encoded into a set of input-output
constraints. The “safeable region” for a given advisory represents the locations in the input space
for which that advisory can be selected for which future advisories exist that will prevent an NMAC
from occurring. If no future advisories exist for preventing an NMAC, the advisory for the current
state is considered “unsafeable,” and the region in the input space for which an advisory is considered
unsafeable is the “unsafeable region.” Refer to the top plot of Figure 5 for an example of these regions
for the CL1500 advisory.
The constraints we would thus like to enforce in our safe predictor are the following: x ∈
Aunsafeable,i ⇒ F i(x) < maxj F j(x),∀i, where Aunsafeable,i is the unsafeable region for the
ith advisory and F j(x) is the output score for the jth advisory. As is, the output regions of the
safeable constraints are not convex. To convert to convex output regions, we use a conservative
approximation by enforcing F i(x) = minj F j(x), ∀x ∈ Aunsafeable,i (i.e., ensure that the unsafeable
advisory always has the lowest score).
C.2 Proximity Functions
We start by generating the bounds on the unsafeable regions using open source code6 from Julian
et al. [2019], then computing a “distance function” between points in the input space, (vO − vI , h, τ),
and the unsafeable region for each advisory. While not true distances, these values are 0 if and only if
the data point is inside the unsafeable set, and so when they are used to produce proximity functions
as in Equation 1, the safety properties are respected. Examples of the unsafeable region, distance
function, and proximity function (after the parameters, Σ, have been optimized during training) for
the CL1500 advisory are shown in Figure 5.
C.3 Structure of Predictors
The compressed versions of the policy tables created by both Julian et al. [2016] for ACAS Xu and Ju-
lian et al. [2019] for VerticalCAS are neural networks with six hidden-layers, 45 dimensions in each
hidden layer, and ReLU activation functions. We use this same architecture for our implementation
of the standard, unconstrained network.
For our constrained predictors, we chose to use this same structure, except the first four hidden
layers are shared between all of the predictors. The idea here is that we should learn a single, shared
representation of the input space, while still giving each predictor some room to adapt to its own
constraints. Following the shared layers, each individual constrained predictor has two additional
hidden layers, and their final outputs are projected onto our convex approximation of the safe region
of the output space. This is accomplished by setting the score for any unsafeable advisory, i, to
Gi~b(x) = minj G
j
~b
(x) − , where Gj~b is the score assigned to the jth advisory by the constrained
predictor, G~b. We use  = 0.0001 in our experiments.
The number of separate predictors required to enforce the VerticalCAS safeability constraints using
our approach is 30. These predictors introduce additional parameters, thus increasing the size of the
network from 270 to 2880 nodes for the unconstrained and safe implementations, respectively. Our
safe predictor, however, remains orders of magnitude smaller than the original look-up tables.
C.4 Parameter Optimization
We define our networks and perform the parameter optimization using PyTorch (Paszke et al. [2017]).
We optimize the parameters of both the unconstrained network and our safe predictor using the
asymmetric loss function from Julian et al. [2016] and Julian et al. [2019] to guide the network to
select optimal advisories while also accurately predicting the scores from the look-up tables for all
advisories. We split each dataset using an 80/20 train and test split, respectively, with the random
seed set to 0 using scikit-learn’s (Pedregosa et al. [2011]) STRATIFIEDSHUFFLESPLIT. The optimizer
is ADAM (Kingma and Ba [2014]) with a learning rate of 0.0003 and batch size of 216. The number
of training epochs is set to 500.
6https://github.com/kjulian3/Safeable
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Figure 2: Example of standard, unconstrained (top) and safe, constrained (bottom) neural networks
for a notional regression problem with X := R1, Y := R1, and the constraint that x > 0 ⇒ y =
F (x) > 0. Note that the unconstrained network (blue line in top plot) violates the constraint for
the inputs that are positive and close to 0. The middle plot shows the predictors, G0 and G1, that
are used to construct the safe predictor, which is depicted by the blue line in the bottom plot. Note
that the safe predictor smoothly transitions from G0 to G1 and obeys the specified constraint, while
performing similar to the unconstrained predictor in the areas outside of the constraint.
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Figure 3: Example of standard, unconstrained (middle left) and safe, constrained (middle right)
neural networks for a notional regression problem with X := R2, Y := R1, and the constraints that
x ∈ A1 ⇒ 0.7 < F (x) < 1, and x ∈ A2 ⇒ 0.5 < F (x) < 0.8. Truth is shown in the top left, and
the constraints are depicted in the top right. Training samples are represented by white dots in the
truth plot. The four sets of learned weights for the constrained predictors are shown in the bottom
row. Note that the unconstrained network clearly violates the constraints for some of the points in
both regions. The safe predictor obeys the specified constraints, with a smooth (but quick) transition
between the unconstrained and constrained regions of the input space.
Figure 4: Depiction of three of the input variables for the VerticalCAS system, from Julian et al.
[2019].
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Figure 5: Top plot shows the safeable region (green) and unsafeable region (red) for the CL1500
advisory, and the region where no safeable advisories exist (white), generated in Julian et al. [2019].
Middle and bottom plots depict the “distance” to the unsafeable region and the learned proximity func-
tion, respectively, for the CL1500 advisory, for a slice of the input space at vO − vI = −180 ft/sec.
The learned proximity function is 0 inside the unsafeable region (by construction) and quickly
transitions to 1 outside of this region.
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